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DECONSTRUCTING DATA PROTECTION: 
 
THE ‘ADDED-VALUE’ OF A RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE EU LEGAL 
ORDER 
 
ORLA LYNSKEY 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits 
alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter’s 
inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other key human rights 
documents which generally treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its 
introduction, and relationship with the established right to privacy, therefore merit an 
explanation.  
 
This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It 
demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently 
conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as 
well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that 
the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with 
more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced 
control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it 
fosters the development of individual personality and, second, it reduces the power and 
information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data.  For these 
reasons, this paper suggests that there may be merit in explicitly recognising these additional 
dimensions of the right to data protection.   
 
KEYWORDS 
Data protection, privacy, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Court of Justice of the EU, 
informational self-determination, information and power asymmetries  
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I. INTRODUCTION:  
 
Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
1
 (EU Charter) sets out a right to data 
protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the right to privacy set out in Article 7 of the 
Charter. This inclusion of a right to data protection in the EU Charter differentiates it from other 
key human rights documents
2
, which tend to treat data protection as a subset of the right to 
privacy.
3
 When the Charter was signed and proclaimed as a solemn political declaration in 2000, 
the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) had yet to recognise the existence of a right to data 
protection in the EU legal order.
4
 Moreover, the European Data Protection Directive
5
, enacted in 
1995, makes no reference to the right to data protection. Its inclusion in the Charter therefore 
merits justification. Unfortunately, the Charter’s explanatory memorandum6 is of little actual 
explanatory value in this regard. It laconically states that the right to data protection is based on 
Article 286 EC
7
, the Data Protection Directive
8
, Article 8 ECHR
9
 and the Council of Europe’s 
Convention No 108.
10
 It therefore does little to elucidate why such a new right was introduced, in 
addition to the pre-existing right to privacy, and how these two rights should interact.   
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, LSE Law Department. My thanks to Dr Albertina Albors-Llorens, Dr Christopher 
Kuner, Mr Angus Johnston and Professor Andrew Murray who have contributed to the development of the thoughts 
expressed in this paper. All opinions expressed and errors remain my own.  
1
 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01 and [2010] 
OJ C83/389. 
  
2
 However, such an independent right exists at national level in many EU Member States. See further, JA 
Cannataci and JP Mifsud-Bonnici, ‘Data Protection Comes of Age: The Data Protection Clauses in the European 
Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 14 Information and Communications Technology Law 5, 8.  
3
 For instance, data protection is treated as a subset of the right to privacy by national Constitutions in the 
Netherlands, Spain and Finland. Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution, entitled ‘The right to privacy’ states 
‘Everyone's private life, honour, and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the 
protection of personal data are laid down by an Act.’ 
4
 This right was recognised for the first time by the Court in Promusicae in 2008. Case C-275/06 
Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España [2008] ECR I-271, para 63.  
5
 European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/23 (Directive 
95/46 EC).   
6
 Explanatory Memorandum, Convention document CHARTE 4473/00, 11 October 2000 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf>.  
7
 Art 286 EC stated that ‘Community acts on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and the free movement of such data shall apply to the institutions and bodies set up by, or on the basis 
of, this Treaty’. 
8
 Directive 95/46 EC (n 5).    
9
 This provision sets out the right to respect for private life and will be the subject of detailed consideration 
in section three.  
10
 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, ETS No 108, 28.I.1981 <www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm>.   
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The failure to provide a convincing rationale for the inclusion of a right to data protection 
in the EU Charter prompted scholars to advance potential justifications. It has been suggested, 
for instance, that the Charter’s right to data protection was introduced in order to bolster the 
legitimacy of EU data protection law by emphasising the fundamental rights dimension of the 
Data Protection Directive.
11
 Indeed, although the Directive’s stated objectives are to ensure the 
free flow of personal data in the EU internal market and to protect fundamental rights, the 
Directive was legally justified on the basis of internal market considerations alone as the EU 
lacks competence to enact fundamental rights legislation.
12
 This potential justification is 
therefore plausible. Nevertheless, it seems unsatisfactory to accept that a new right has been 
recognised in the EU legal order to provide ex-post legitimacy to existing legislation. Moreover, 
if data protection is a subset of the right to privacy, why would the right to privacy, long 
recognised by the CJEU as a general principle of EU law
13
 and set out in the EU Charter, not be 
sufficient to legitimise the fundamental rights dimension of the EU’s data protection framework?  
 
Other scholars suggest that the right to data protection was included in the Charter in 
order to extend the application of the data protection rules to personal data processing in areas 
which are explicitly excluded from the material scope of the Data Protection Directive (namely, 
personal data processing for Common Foreign and Security Policy purposes and for the purposes 
of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal matters).
14
 This view has received some implicit 
support from the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP), an advisory group on data protection 
matters composed of representatives of national data protection authorities.
15
 Indeed, prior to the 
adoption of the Charter, the EU’s Expert Group on Fundamental Rights highlighted data 
                                                 
11
 P De Hert and S Gutwirth, ‘Data Protection in the case law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’ in S Gutwirth, Y Poullet, P De Hert, S Nouwt and C De Terwangne (eds), 
Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer, 2009), 5.  
12
 The legal basis of the Directive (ex art 95 EEC, now art 114 TFEU) allows for the enactment of 
legislation which will approximate the laws of the Member States to improve the functioning of the internal market.  
13
 See, Case C- 137/79 National Panasonic v Commission [1980] ECR I-2033, paras 18-20.  
14
 A Rouvroy and Y Poullet, ‘The right to informational self-determination and the value of self-
development: Reassessing the importance of privacy for democracy’ in S Gutwirth et al (n 11). See also Cannataci 
and Mifsud-Bonnici, who recognise that arguably ‘having data protection formally firmly entrenched at a 
constitutional level will put a stop to current “anti-data protection principles” positions taken by the Member States 
both at an EU level in the areas covered in the second and third pillars and  at national levels’ (n 2) 5-6. 
15
 Article 29 Working Party (A29WP), ‘The Future of Privacy - Joint contribution to the Consultation of the 
European Commission on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data’, adopted on 
1 December 2009 (WP168), 7. 
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protection as an area in which the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights differed across the 
three pillars of EU activity.
16
 However, a number of arguments militate against this rationale for 
the new right to data protection. First, at present there is less scope for such differentiation than 
was previously the case. Not only did the Lisbon Treaty (which gave the Charter its binding 
force) put an end to the former pillar structure, it also provides a legal basis for data protection 
legislation covering all aspects of Union law.
17
 Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the 
recognition of a right to data protection in the EU legal order has not in fact had the effect of 
putting an end to such differentiation. The European Commission’s proposed reform package for 
data protection makes this abundantly clear: the Commission’s Proposed Regulation18 sets out 
the general rules applicable to personal data processing, while the Proposed Directive
19
 sets out 
specific rules applicable to personal data processing for the purposes of law enforcement. 
Consequently, even if the right to data protection was introduced with the objective of ensuring 
that uniform data protection rules apply in all areas of EU law, it has not achieved this objective. 
What is apparent from this scholarly speculation is that the EU has neither adequately justified 
the introduction of the right to data protection in the EU legal order nor explained its content.   
 
The objective of this paper is to examine whether there is, or could be, a credible 
rationale for introducing an independent right to data protection to the EU legal order. In 
particular, this paper seeks to ascertain whether data protection is merely a subset of the right to 
privacy or whether it should be treated as a self-standing right. At present, conceptions of the 
role data protection norms should play in society differ greatly between EU Member States. In 
the UK and Ireland, data protection is treated as a subset of the right to privacy with Courts 
refusing to apply data protection legislation in situations where the right to privacy is not 
                                                 
16
 See Report of the Expert Group on Fundamental Rights, ‘Affirming Fundamental Rights in the EU: Time 
to Act’, Brussels, February 1999, 8. <http://ftp.infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/database/000038001-
000039000/000038827.pdf>.  
17
 Art 16(2) TFEU provides that the EU legislature shall ‘lay down the rules relating to the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by…the Member States when carrying out activities which 
fall within the scope of Union law’ (emphasis added). Some differentiation nevertheless remains: see, for example, 
art 39 EU.  
18
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation) COM (2012) 11 final. 
19
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and 
the free movement of such data COM (2012) 10 final.  
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engaged.
20
 However, there has been a recent notable exception as a judgment of the UK High 
Court highlighted the distinction between the two rights in order to limit the justiciability of the 
Charter right to data protection.
21
 In contrast, several continental European jurisdictions refuse to 
systematically link the application of data protection rules to the right to privacy. For instance, in 
Germany, the Constitutional Court has held that data protection rights flow from the individual’s 
right to ‘informational self-determination’22, a right which the Court had previously derived from 
the rights to human dignity
23
 and free development of personality
24
 in the German Basic Law.  
 
This paper does not purport to take a comparative law approach to data protection. 
Rather, these differing conceptions of the roots and purposes of data protection are highlighted 
because of their practical consequences for the application of EU data protection law by Member 
States. The Commission’s Proposed Regulation, the centrepiece of the EU data protection reform 
proposals, seeks to achieve further procedural and substantive harmonisation of national laws. 
This begs the question, is such substantive harmonisation possible when the central objectives of 
the right to data protection, which is given expression by EU data protection legislation, are 
disputed? For instance, would a court in the UK and a court in Germany reach the same 
conclusion when adopting a purposive approach to the interpretation the Proposed Data 
Protection Regulation? It seems unlikely. Perhaps more fundamentally however, this lack of 
clarity regarding the objectives of the right to data protection also detracts from the legitimacy of 
the EU data protection regime. How can the EU justify the de facto extraterritorial application of 
its regime or encourage the global application of its data protection standards when it cannot, or 
does not, articulate the precise purposes of such a regime? The question addressed in this paper 
                                                 
20
 For instance, in Durant, the Court of Appeal interpreted the notoriously broad concept of ‘personal data’ 
narrowly by finding that whether data constitutes personal data depends inter alia on whether the data is biographical 
in a significant sense or relates to ‘a life event in respect of which his privacy could not be said to be compromised’ 
and whether it is ‘information that affects his privacy, whether in his personal or family life, business or professional 
capacity’ (Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, Auld LJ at para 28).  
21
 In R (on the application of AB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 3453 
Mostyn J was asked to consider a claim based, inter alia, on the claimant’s right to data protection. He stated that the 
right to protection of personal data is not part of the ECHR and has therefore not been incorporated into domestic 
law by the Human Rights Act (para 16). He argued that Parliament had deliberately excluded aspects of the ECHR 
from the Human Rights Act and that the Charter contained ‘all of those missing parts and more’ (para 14), including 
the right to data protection.   
22
 ‘Population Census Decision’, Judgment of 15 December 1983, 1 BvR 209/83,  BVerfGE 65, 1.  
23
 Art 1(1) German Basic Law (Deutscher Bundestag, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 
<www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>).  
24
 Ibid, art 2(1).  
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is therefore one which is integral to the coherence, proportionality and legitimacy of EU data 
protection law.  
 
In order to expound a potential rationale for the right to data protection, this paper is 
structured as follows. In section two, the jurisprudence of the CJEU is analysed to see whether it 
sheds light on the meaning of an independent right to data protection or on the relationship 
between the rights to data protection and privacy. The analysis of this jurisprudence reveals that 
the CJEU consistently conflates the two rights which would indicate that the right to data 
protection is no more than a facet of the right to privacy. This finding is tested in section three by 
comparing the protection offered by the right to data protection, as given expression in EU data 
protection legislation, to that offered by the right to privacy, as interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). A systematic analysis of the protection offered by the two 
rights reveals that although heavily overlapping, the rights to data protection and privacy are 
distinct. It is argued that data protection offers individuals more rights over more types of 
information than the right to privacy when applied in the context of personal data processing. 
Consequently, the ‘added value’ of data protection is that it offers individuals enhanced control 
over their personal data. Section four suggests that this enhanced control serves two primary 
functions: first, it strengthens the hand of the individual when faced with power and information 
asymmetries and, second, it proactively promotes the individuals’ personality rights which are 
threatened by personal data processing. This paper therefore concludes that the content of the 
right to data protection overlaps with that of the right to privacy yet that data protection merits 
recognition as an independent right for these reasons.  
 
II. THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION BEFORE THE CJEU  
 
 
The explanation proffered by the EU for the inclusion of a right to data protection in the EU 
Charter is both vague and circular, as mentioned in section one. The jurisprudence of the CJEU, 
which will be examined in this section, constitutes one logical starting point for insights into the 
purpose of this right in the EU legal order and its relationship with the established right to 
privacy. This examination takes place in two stages. The EU Charter became binding on EU 
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Member States with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009.
25
 The 
Court’s case law from before this point shall firstly be examined before considering the case law 
following the Charter’s acquisition of binding force.  
 
The reason for this bifurcated examination of the case law is that it might be expected 
that the CJEU would be less forthright in its support of a self-standing right to data protection 
prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This is because, unlike the right to privacy, 
the right to data protection is not a general principle of EU law recognised on the basis of the 
common constitutional traditions of Member States, nor is it a right which is explicitly 
mentioned in the ECHR. From the Court’s perspective it would therefore appear more prudent to 
emphasize data protection’s link to the established right to privacy in those early years rather 
than carving out an independent existence for this right. However, the introduction of an explicit 
legal basis for data protection in the Treaty of Lisbon, which coincided with the Charter 
acquiring binding force, arguably paved the way for the CJEU to clearly demarcate the 
distinctions, if any, between these two rights. As this section will demonstrate, the CJEU has not 
seized this opportunity to distinguish between the two rights. With one notable exception, the 
Court’s jurisprudence has been characterised by its consistent conflation of the rights to data 
protection and privacy during the period prior to and after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
A. The Right to Data Protection in a Pre-Charter Era  
In Rundfunk
26
, one of the earliest cases regarding the Data Protection Directive to appear before 
the Court of Justice, a national jurisdiction asked the Court to assess the compatibility of a 
                                                 
25 
The situation of the UK and Poland (and subsequently the Czech Republic) remains slightly 
differentiated to that of other Member States. These three Member States signed Protocol 30 to the Lisbon Treaty, 
which clarifies the effect of the Charter in domestic legal systems. Nevertheless, the precise effect of the Charter in 
domestic systems remains contested. The ECJ has held that the Protocol does not have the effect of exempting these 
countries ‘from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court of one of those 
Member States from ensuring compliance with those provisions’ (see Joined Cases C--411/10 N.S. v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department and C-493/10 M.E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2011] ECR I-0000, 119). However, Mostyn J in the UK High Court in R(AB) (n 
21) expressed his surprise at the claimant’s reliance on EU Charter rights as he was ‘sure that the British government 
… had secured at the negotiations of the Lisbon Treaty an opt-out from the incorporation of the Charter into EU 
law’ (para 10).   
26
 Case C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-4989. 
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national auditing requirement with the Directive. Austrian legislation stipulated that the salaries 
of senior public officials must be communicated to the national audit body, transmitted to the 
Parliament and later made publicly available. In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized 
that the provisions of the Directive must be interpreted in light of fundamental rights, in 
particular privacy. Therefore, ‘for the purposes of applying the Directive’, the Court 
systematically examined whether there had been an interference with the right to privacy 
contrary to Article 8 ECHR and, if so, whether it was justified. In so doing, the Court entirely 
overlooked the specific rules set out in the Data Protection Directive. In other words, the Court 
simply substituted privacy rules for data protection rules. As the interpretation of Article 8 
ECHR alone was decisive in resolving the dispute, this led to concern regarding the future role 
and relevance of data protection rules.
27
 Moreover, as Rundfunk treated data protection and 
privacy as interchangeable, it lent credence to the assertion that data protection is a subset of the 
right to privacy. Nevertheless, a strong argument could be made to limit the Rundfunk reasoning 
to its facts as the Court would have reached an identical outcome had it relied on the Directive 
rather than the right to privacy. Therefore, while the Court should have exercised more caution in 
substituting the application of secondary legislation with the application of a general principle of 
EU law, it could not be stated with certainty post-Rundfunk that data protection and privacy were 
substitutable rights in all circumstances.  
 
In Promusicae
28
 the Court considered whether EU law requires Member States to adopt 
national legislation placing an obligation on internet service providers (ISPs) to supply the 
personal data of alleged copyright infringers to copyright holders in order to facilitate civil 
proceedings. In particular, the Spanish referring court asked the Court of Justice whether a 
positive obligation to supply such personal data to copyright holders flowed from three EU 
Intellectual Property (IP) Directives.
29
 The Court of Justice reformulated the questions asked by 
                                                 
27
 CD Classen, ‘Case C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others: case-note’ (2004) 41 CMLRev 
1377, 1383.  
28
 Case C-275/06 Promusicae (n 4).  
29
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector [2002] OJ 
L201/37, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1 
and Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L167/10. 
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the national court by firstly considering whether European Data Protection law, in particular the 
Data Protection Directive and the E-Privacy Directive
30
, precludes a Member State from laying 
down such an obligation. It then addressed the question asked by the Spanish Court; whether the 
three IP Directives require a Member State to adopt legislation setting out such an obligation. 
Finally, the Court considered what impact the EU Charter, which was not yet binding on 
Member States, should have on the conclusions it had reached to the first two questions. It noted 
that the factual situation involved, on the one hand, the rights to property and to effective judicial 
protection, and, on the other hand, ‘a further fundamental right, namely the right that guarantees 
protection of personal data and hence of private life’.31 While the Promusicae judgment offered 
some initial promise as the Court raised data protection concerns of its own volition, this promise 
was short-lived given the Court’s reference to the distinct rights to data protection and privacy as 
one right. Although the Court noted that the E-Privacy Directive ‘seeks to ensure full respect for 
the rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter’32 it went on to state in the following 
paragraph that ‘[t]he present reference for a preliminary ruling thus raises the question of the 
need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of different fundamental rights, namely the 
right to respect for private life on the one hand and the rights to protection of property and to an 
effective remedy on the other’.33 Therefore, to the Court data protection is synonymous with 
privacy.  
 
In the later case of Satamedia
34
, where the Court was asked to reconcile data protection 
legislation and the right to freedom of expression, the Court seemingly returned to its pre-
Promusicae position. No reference was made to the right to data protection and the Directive was 
treated as a privacy protection tool. For instance, the Court noted that Article 9 of the Directive 
seeks to reconcile two fundamental rights: ‘the protection of privacy and freedom of 
expression’.35 Therefore, during the period prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treary, the 
                                                 
30
 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L201/37. The second recital of the E-Privacy Directive states 
that it ‘In particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full respect for the rights set out in Articles 7 and 8 of that 
Charter’. 
31
 Para 63.  
32
 Para 64.  
33
 Para 65.  
34
 Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi OY, Satamedia [2008] ECR I-09831.  
35
 Ibid, para 54 
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right to data protection is considered by the Court of Justice as a subset of the right to privacy 
which does not merit independent consideration.  
 
One judgment of the General Court, the lower instance of the CJEU, sits uneasily with 
this line of jurisprudence which treats data protection as a subset of the established right to 
privacy. In Bavarian Lager
36
 the General Court was asked to reconcile the right to data 
protection with the right of access to documents (also enshrined in the EU Charter).  The 
Bavarian Lager company made a request to the European Commission under EU access to 
documents legislation (Regulation 1049/2001
37
) for minutes to a particular meeting and the 
names of the meeting attendees. The Commission would only provide the data in anonymised 
form on the basis that the information requested contained personal data and the disclosure of the 
data would not be in compliance with the data protection rules applicable to the EU Institutions 
(Regulation 45/2001
38
). The General Court was asked to determine whether this Commission 
Decision to refuse the relevant data struck the correct balance between the freedom of 
information and data protection in the EU legal order.  
 
Article 4(1)(b) of the access to documents regulation determines the relationship between 
these two rights. It provides that a request for access to a document shall be refused where the 
document’s disclosure would undermine the protection of ‘privacy and the integrity of the 
individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of 
personal data’. Article 4(1)(b) therefore arguably contains two limbs: access to a document 
should be refused when ‘disclosure would undermine the privacy and integrity of the individual’ 
(first limb), ‘in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding the protection of 
personal data’ (second limb). The dispute in Bavarian Lager centred upon the interaction 
between these two limbs. Indeed, Article 4(1)(b) could be read in a number of ways. On the one 
hand, it could be assumed that the second limb is merely expanding on the first and that the data 
protection rules should be applied to determine whether disclosure would undermine privacy. 
                                                 
36
 T-194/04 Bavarian Lager v Commission [2007] ECR II-3201.  
37
 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [OJ] L 145/43.  
38
 Regulation 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies 
and on the free movement of such data [2001] OJ L8/1. 
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However, an alternative reading of these two limbs is possible, according to which it is only 
when the first limb is satisfied (i.e. privacy is undermined) that it is necessary, pursuant to the 
second limb, to apply the data protection rules. This is the interpretation preferred by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who intervened before the Court in Bavarian 
Lager.
39
 The General Court also seemingly preferred this interpretation as, when applying 
Article 4(1)(b), it began by examining whether the disclosure of the names of those attending the 
meeting would breach their Article 8 ECHR right to privacy. It concluded that the disclosure 
would not result in a violation of the right to privacy and therefore that the Article 4(1)(b) 
exception was not applicable.
40
 As a result, the General Court held that the application to the 
request of the ‘additional conditions’ set out in the European data protection legislation, such as 
the need for consent of the data subject would be contrary to Regulation 1049/2001.
41
 As a 
result, the General Court annulled the Commission decision.  
 
The reasoning of the General Court in this case appears clear; in the absence of a 
violation of the right to privacy as a result of the disclosure of a document, the data protection 
rules do not apply. While at first glance this could be confused for another example of the 
conflation of the rights to data protection and privacy, it is in fact the opposite. The Court 
interpreted the wording of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001 to mean that in cases of 
conflict between data protection and freedom of information, the data protection rules prevail 
only when privacy is undermined. When privacy is not undermined, the freedom of information 
rules prevail over the data protection rules. Therefore, the interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) 
advanced by the General Court and the EDPS acknowledges that not all data processing 
adversely affects the right to privacy and, consequently, that data protection applies to a wider 
variety of personal data than privacy law. In other words, the material scope of application of the 
two rights is distinct. Indeed, this was explicitly stated by both actors. In its pleading before the 
Court the EDPS stressed that the interest protected by Article 4(1)(b) is private life, and not the 
                                                 
39
 EDPS pleading in T-194/04 Bavarian Lager v Commission, section 8. Moreover, the EDPS argued that 
had the legislator intended to give art 4(1)(b) the meaning supported by the Commission’s ‘renvoi-theory’ 
(according to which there is a direct referral to the data protection rules whenever a requested document contains 
personal data), ‘the wording of the exception could and should have been far more explicit’. 
40
 T-194/04 Bavarian Lager (n 36) paras 132-133.  
41
 Ibid, para 137.  
12 
 
much broader concept of personal data
42
 while in its judgment the General Court asserted that 
privacy and data protection are not synonymous.
43
 While De Hert and Gutwirth suggest that the 
ease with which the General Court distinguished between two types of personal data – those that 
are protected by the right to privacy and those that are not – ‘does not sit comfortably with the 
formal constitutional codification of data protection within EU law’44, it is argued here that the 
opposite is in fact true. By recognising that data protection rules could apply even in the absence 
of an infringement of privacy, the General Court and the EDPS were liberating the data 
protection rules from the right to privacy and paving the way for the emergence of a truly 
independent right to data protection in the EU legal order. However, as will be demonstrated 
presently, the Court of Justice has steadfastly overlooked this distinction in its jurisprudence, 
even following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
B. The Post-Lisbon Jurisprudence of the CJEU   
The binding force acquired by the EU Charter as well as the introduction of an explicit legal 
basis for data protection legislation in the Lisbon Treaty provided the CJEU with the necessary 
legal tools to elaborate on the content and meaning of an independent right to data protection. 
However, as this section will demonstrate, the Court has not taken this opportunity to expound a 
new vision for the right to data protection.     
 
In her Opinion in Volker, delivered soon after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Advocate General Sharpston clearly distinguished between the rights to data protection and 
privacy stating that ‘[t]wo separate rights are here invoked: a classic right (the protection of 
privacy under Article 8 ECHR) and a more modern right (the data protection provisions of 
                                                 
42
 It, therefore, argued that, whilst a reference to the name of a participant in the minutes of a meeting 
constitutes personal data, the disclosure of a name in the context of professional activities does not normally have a 
link to private life. Ibid, para 67.   
43
 It stated that ‘not all personal data are by their nature capable of undermining the private life of the 
person concerned. In recital 33 of the General Directive, reference is made to data which are capable by their nature 
of infringing fundamental freedoms or privacy and which should not be processed unless the data subject gives his 
explicit consent, which implies that not all data are of that nature’. Ibid, para 119.  
44
 P De Hert and S Gutwirth, ‘Data Protection in the in the case law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg: 
Constitutionalisation in Action’ in Gutwirth, Poullet, De Hert, Nouwt &  De Terwangne (eds), Reinventing Data 
Protection? (Springer, 2009), 41.  
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Convention No 108)’.45 While, unfortunately, the Advocate General did not elaborate on the 
meaning of this distinction or the content of this ‘more modern right’, her statement, coupled 
with the General Court’s judgment in Bavarian Lager, should have provided the Court of Justice 
with food for thought on the differences between the two rights.   
 
However, when the General Court’s Bavarian Lager judgment was appealed to the Court 
of Justice
46
, the Court of Justice held that the lower jurisdiction had erred in law. It found that by 
limiting the application of the Article 4(1)(b) exception to situations in which the privacy or 
integrity of the individual would be infringed under Article 8 ECHR, the General Court had 
disregarded the wording of Article 4(1)(b), which requires that this assessment should  be made 
in conformity with the Union’s data protection legislation.47 Personal data processing cases could 
not, according to the Court, be separated into two categories: those examined in light of the 
ECHR right to privacy and those examined for compliance with European data protection 
legislation.
48
 Therefore, the Court of Justice concluded that in all situations where access is 
sought to a document containing personal data EU data protection rules become applicable in 
their entirety.
49
 The practical consequence of this finding is that EU data protection rules must 
systematically prevail over the EU rules on freedom of information. 
 
The Court’s judgment is noteworthy not only because it allows one fundamental right in 
the EU Charter to consistently trump another in this manner, but also because of what it reveals 
regarding the Court’s view of the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. 
It follows implicitly from the judgment that even when there is no infringement of the 
individual’s right to privacy (as was arguably the case in Bavarian Lager), the data protection 
rules trump the freedom of information rules. This begs the question, if the interest being 
protected by the Court in this instance is not privacy, what is the Court protecting? While the 
Court did not consider the matter explicitly, the Court may have assumed that a failure to comply 
with data protection legislation always undermines the right to privacy. In other words, despite 
                                                 
45
 C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Hartmut Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063, Opinion of 
Advocate General Sharpston, para 71.  
46
 C-28/08 European Commission v Bavarian Lager [2010] ECR I-6055.  
47
 Ibid, paras 58-59.   
48
 Ibid, 58-61.  
49
 Ibid, 63.  
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the assertions of the EDPS and the findings of the General Court to the contrary
50
, the Court 
treats data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. It is unclear whether this represents a 
conscious choice on the part of the Court or simply highlights that the Court has not given the 
distinction between the two rights adequate (or perhaps any) consideration. The subsequent 
Volker judgment seems to point to the latter conclusion. In Volker the Court firstly states that the 
two rights are ‘closely connected’51 before soon thereafter treating them as a hybrid species when 
it refers to ‘the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal data, 
recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.’52  
 
One explanation for the conflation of the two rights by the Court of Justice is that the 
Court has erroneously interpreted the ECtHR’s Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence and applied this 
interpretation directly to the EU Charter articles. Indeed, in the Volker judgment the Court of 
Justice states that the Article 7 and 8 rights concern ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual’. It cites the ECtHR judgments in Amann v Switzerland53 and Rotaru v 
Romania
54
 as authority for this assertion.
55
 However, the cited case law does not in fact support 
the proposition that Article 8 ECHR applies to ‘any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable person’. Rather, this is how the Data Protection Directive defines ‘personal data’.56 
Indeed, as will be seen in the follow section, despite the ECtHR’s expansive interpretation of the 
right to privacy, it is frequently advocated that the right to privacy does not apply to the same 
wide range of data to which data protection rules apply.
57
  
 
More recently in his Opinion in Google Spain
58
, Advocate General Jääskinen argued that 
the scope of application of the EU data protection rules has become ‘surprisingly wide’ and 
highlighted that ‘the wide interpretation given by the Court to the fundamental right to private 
                                                 
50
 Ibid, fn 41.   
51
 C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and Hartmut Eifert [2010] ECR I-11063, para 47. 
52
 Ibid, para 52.  
53
 Amann v Switzerland (2000) 30 EHRR 843. 
54
 Rotaru v Romania (App No 28341/95) (unreported) 4 May 2000. 
55
 Volker (n 51) para 52.  
56
 Directive 95/46 EC (n 5) art 2(a).  
57
 See, for instance, Opinion of the A29WP, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data’, 20 June 
2007, 01248/07/EN  WP 136, or H Kranenborg, ‘Access to documents and data protection in the European Union: 
on the public nature of personal data’ (2008) 45(4) CMLRev 1079, 1091.  
58
 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL & Google Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González [2013] ECR I-0000.   
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life in a data protection context seems to expose any human communication by electronic means 
to the scrutiny by reference to this right’.59 As a result, the Advocate General called for what he 
termed a ‘rule of reason’ approach to the application of the data protection rules.60 However, it is 
suggested that the conflation of the rights to privacy and data protection caused confusion in the 
Advocate General’s Opinion. It is not ‘the fundamental right to private life in a data protection 
context’ which is given a wide interpretation. Rather, it is argued here that it is the fundamental 
right to data protection which is in fact more widely interpreted – and broader in scope – than the 
right to privacy. The Advocate General overlooks the fact that data protection rules were 
purposely designed to be broader in scope than the right to privacy by the EU legislature and 
seems to suggest that technological development is responsible for their wide application. As 
will be demonstrated in the next section this is a false assumption.  
 
A clear picture emerges from the few data protection cases which have appeared before 
the CJEU both prior to and following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Contrary to the 
instinct of the General Court, the Court of Justice deems the newly articulated right to data 
protection to be nothing more than a subset of the right to privacy thereby putting ‘new wine in 
old bottles’.61 However, this paper shall argue that, despite the Court of Justice’s indications to 
the contrary, data protection and privacy are distinct rights, albeit heavily overlapping, and that 
there is adequate justification to treat them as such. However, at present, the conflation of these 
two rights by the Court of Justice risks subjecting the modern right of data protection to the 
limitations that have been imposed on the ‘classic’ right to privacy thereby stunting its 
development.  It also precludes debate, both inside and outside the Court, of what independent 
objectives data protection pursues and how best to reconcile these objectives with competing 
rights and interests.  
 
                                                 
59
 Ibid, para 29.   
60
 In fact it is submitted that what the Advocate General was asking for was the application of the principle 
of proportionality when interpreting the Directive (although, as a general principle of EU law, the principle of 
proportionality is applied at all times when interpreting EU law). He considered that such an approach was 
necessary in order to avoid ‘unreasonable and excessive legal consequences’. Ibid, para 30.   
61
 Similarly, Schwartz and Reidenberg have noted that calling data protection ‘information privacy’ is an 
attempt to ‘put new wine in old bottles’. Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of 
United States Data Protection (MICHIE Law Publishers, 1996), 102.  
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III. DIFFERENTIATING DATA PROTECTION: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
In this section, the key distinctions between the protection offered by the right to data protection, 
as given expression in EU secondary legislation, and the right to privacy, set out in Article 8 
ECHR, will be identified. This can be done by comparing the scope and safeguards offered by 
EU data protection law to the scope and safeguards offered by the right to privacy. The scope 
and safeguards of the latter can be deduced from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
62
 It is argued 
in this section, that the right to data protection includes a broader range of data and data-related 
actions within its scope and guarantees more data-processing related rights to the individual than 
the right to privacy.
63
 In other words, data protection offers individuals more control over more 
types of data than the right to privacy. Data protection should therefore be conceived as a right 
which heavily overlaps with the right to privacy yet offers additional, distinct benefits for 
individuals.  
 
A. The Broader Range of Data and Data-Related Actions Covered by the Right to 
Data Protection     
 
In this part it shall be demonstrated that the scope of application of the data protection rules – 
determined by what constitutes ‘personal data’ and ‘personal data processing’ – is broader than 
the concept of ‘privacy interference’ which defines the scope of application of Article 8(1) 
ECHR.  
   
1. The Broader Range of Data  
                                                 
62
 This issue has been considered by Brouwer in E Brouwer, Digital Borders and Real Rights: Effective 
Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the Schengen Information System (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 
194-204 and more recently by Purtova (Nadezhda Purtova, Property Rights in Personal Data: a European 
Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 2011), 224-240). Due to space constraints, it is not possible to outline the 
relevant case law in this paper. 
63
 In theory, the right to privacy is not applicable to private parties but this right places ‘positive 
obligations’ on States. It remains unclear whether the EU Charter can be directly invoked in proceedings between 
private parties. While the ECJ refused to give such horizontal direct effect to art 27 of the Charter in Case C-176/12 
AMS v Union locale des syndicats CGT and ors [2014] ECR I-0000, it arguably left the door open to grant other 
rights such effect where the Charter article is ‘sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an individual right which 
they may invoke as such.’ (para 47).   
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The right to data protection, as given expression by EU data protection legislation, applies to 
personal data: that is, data relating to an ‘identified’ or ‘identifiable’ natural person.64 The notion 
of ‘personal data’ was purposely defined as broadly as possible by the European legislature in 
order to include all data which might be linked to an individual.
65
 Indeed, despite the ECtHR’s 
expansive interpretation of the notion of privacy
66
, it is argued that the right to privacy does not 
apply to the same wide range of data to which the data protection rules apply.
67
 Two distinctions 
regarding the range of data falling within the scope of both rights can be observed: first, unlike 
the notion of ‘privacy interference’, the notion of ‘personal data’ is not context dependent68 and, 
second, the notion of personal data includes data relating to unidentified yet identifiable 
individuals.   
 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR often conflates its analysis of, first, whether a prima 
facie privacy interest exists and, secondly, if so, whether there is an interference with this privacy 
interest. This makes it difficult to directly compare the notions of ‘privacy interest’ and ‘personal 
data’ although these notions determine the scope of the rights to privacy and data protection 
respectively. The ECtHR’s conflated analysis also however demonstrates that the notion of 
‘privacy interest’ is often circumstance-dependent and requires a contextual assessment. For 
instance, the assessment of whether an individual has a privacy interest in his name is context-
dependent. The facts of the Bavarian Lager case illustrate this point well as it was questioned 
whether an individual has a privacy interest in his name when he is appearing before a public 
authority in a professional capacity. Advocate General Sharpston argued in her Opinion that 
names fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR and therefore the disclosure of a name, even in a 
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 Art 2(a) Directive 95/46 EC (n 5); arts 4(1) and (2) Proposed Regulation (n 18).     
65
 A29WP, ‘Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data’, adopted on 20 June 2007 (WP 136).  
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business context, constitutes a potential interference contrary to the ECHR. The EDPS argued to 
the contrary that no such privacy interest existed in Bavarian Lager as ‘the disclosure of a name 
in the context of professional activities does not normally have a link to private life’.69 Similarly, 
the General Court inferred that there was not a privacy interest at stake in that case. Although the 
General Court merged its consideration of whether a privacy interest exists and whether it had 
been undermined, in so doing it highlighted that even though professional activities are not in 
principle excluded from the concept of private life under Article 8 ECHR, the mere fact that a 
document contains personal data does not mean that the privacy or integrity of the persons 
concerned is affected.
70
 This, it is argued, is the preferred finding.
71
 However, what is notable for 
present purposes is that there is a clear lack of consensus regarding whether, and if so in what 
circumstances, an individual has a privacy interest in his name. In contrast, as the EDPS 
highlighted, ‘a reference to the name of a participant in the minutes of a meeting constitutes 
personal data’.72 Thus, it can be seen that while the question of whether a ‘privacy interest’ exists 
in particular circumstances requires a context-dependent assessment, whether data constitutes 
personal data is generally an issues which is easier to assess.  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, data protection rules apply to processing of data that 
relates to an identified or identifiable person.
73
 In this regard, data protection rules apply where 
identification is possible, regardless of whether or not identification occurs. However, it appears 
that under Article 8 ECHR emphasis is placed on whether or not an individual is actually 
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70
 Ibid, para 123.  
71
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identified when considering whether there is a breach. For instance, in Friedl
74
 the applicant 
complained that there was an interference with his right to privacy when the police took a 
photograph of him participating in a public demonstration. The European Commission of Human 
Rights (ECommHR) – a predecessor of the ECtHR – struck the case off the list, explicitly 
attaching weight to the fact that no action was taken to identify the persons photographed by 
means of data processing.
75
 Therefore, it is suggested that the notion of personal data is broader 
than the interest protected by the right to privacy. Moreover, as will now be demonstrated, the 
concept of ‘personal data processing’ which also helps delimit the scope of application of the 
right to data protection is clearly more expansive than that of ‘privacy interference’76, which 
determines what falls within the scope of the right to privacy.  
 
2. The Broader Range of Data-Related Activities  
 
For the purposes of EU law, data processing is defined as ‘any operation or set of operations 
which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means’ and could, 
therefore, encompass any form of data handling.
77
 As Kuner highlights ‘it is difficult to conceive 
of any operation performed on personal data in electronic commerce which would not be covered 
by it’.78 While the ECtHR is willing to include even publicly available data within the scope of 
Article 8 ECHR provided it is systematically collected or stored, it is submitted that the notion of 
‘personal data processing’ is nevertheless more inclusive than that of ‘privacy interference’. 
Some examples will help to illustrate this point.  
 
In the case of Pierre Herbecq and the Association ‘Ligue des droits de l’homme’ v 
Belgium
79
, the ECommHR declared that an application made by the applicants was manifestly 
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ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. In their application, the applicants challenged the Belgian 
government’s failure to enact legislation concerning filming for surveillance purposes where the 
visual data obtained was not recorded. The ECommHR examined, inter alia, whether the visual 
data related to private matters or public incidents and whether it was likely to be made available 
to the general public. It held that, since nothing was recorded, it was difficult to see how the 
footage could be made available to the general public or used for alternative purposes. The 
ECommHR also noted that all that could be observed is ‘essentially public behaviour’. Therefore 
this recording, which would constitute personal data processing and therefore fall within the 
scope of the right to data protection, was excluded from the scope of the right to privacy.  
 
In the EU Court of Justice’s Rundfunk80 judgment it also implicitly acknowledges this 
distinction. The Court noted that ‘the mere recording by an employer of data by name relating to 
the remuneration paid to his employees cannot as such constitute an interference with private 
life’ under Article 8 ECHR.81 However, such recording would constitute ‘data processing’ and 
thus fall within the scope of the right to data protection.  
 
It is possible to think of numerous other day-to-day examples of data processing which 
falls within the scope of the right to data protection but arguably not privacy. For instance, if a 
student competes for her university athletics team, the name and age category of the student may 
be is published on the university webpage. This publication constitutes data processing within 
the meaning of EU data protection law. However, such an act would not fall within the scope of 
the right to privacy as the information concerned is publicly available data which is not 
systematically collected or stored. Moreover, it is arguable that the student should have 
reasonably expected her personal data to be processed in this way.
82
  It can, therefore, be 
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 Ibid, para 74.  
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concluded that EU data protection regulation applies when data is manipulated in ways which 
would not be subject to privacy protection.
83
 
 
B. The Limited Range of Information Rights Covered by Article 8 ECHR    
 
Not only is the scope of the right to data protection different to that of the right to privacy, the 
substantive protection offered by both rights also differs. Many of the rights provided for in the 
EU data protection regime have been encompassed in the ECtHR’s Article 8 ECHR 
jurisprudence. When considering whether the collection or storage of data is in accordance with 
the law and is proportionate under Article 8(2) ECHR, the ECtHR has taken the opportunity to 
enumerate a number of requirements which must be respected. These requirements effectively 
mirror the principles relating to data quality set out in both the Data Protection Directive
84
 and 
the Proposed Regulation
85
 (for example, that data should be ‘preserved in a form which permits 
identification of the data subject for no longer than is required for those purposes’86). Moreover, 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is constantly evolving and, in recent years, its evolution has 
encompassed rights offered by data protection law. For instance, although the ECtHR initially 
refused to acknowledge that a data subject had a general right of access to his personal data
87
, in 
later judgments it went a long way towards introducing such a general right of access for 
individuals.
88
  
There is therefore considerable, and growing, overlap in terms of the substantive 
protection offered to individuals by the EU right to data protection and the ECHR’s right to 
privacy. Nevertheless, some rights granted by the EU data protection regime are not referred to 
in the Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence, for instance the individual’s right not to be the subject of a 
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decision which significantly affects him and is based on automatic processing.
89
 It is submitted 
that this type of right is designed to tackle non-privacy related concerns, such as power 
asymmetry between individuals and those who process their data.
90
  This differentiation in terms 
of substantive protection has been made more conspicuous by the Proposed Regulation. For 
example, although privacy law might recognise the right of the data subject to ensure the erasure 
of his personal data in certain instances, it does not recognise anything akin to the ‘right to be 
forgotten’ set out in the Proposed Regulation.91 Moreover, the ECtHR case law does not 
recognise a right to data portability.
92
 Indeed, this confirms that the objective of such a right is 
not to protect individual privacy; it must therefore serve a different, independent objective.     
 
In conclusion, when determining whether the protection offered by Article 8 ECHR is 
coextensive to that offered by the right to data protection, it can be seen that the two differ in 
terms of scope and also the substantive protection they offer. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
rights to data protection and privacy are significantly overlapping yet distinct. In this regard, the 
Proposed Regulation is a timely reminder as it clearly illustrates that EU data protection law 
includes within its scope elements which do not fit easily under a privacy umbrella. These other 
elements are therefore what distinguish the right to data protection from the right to privacy. In 
the following section, a justification for the distinction between these two rights will be offered.  
 
IV. THE VALUE-ADDED OF A RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE EU 
LEGAL ORDER 
 
The rights to data protection and privacy serve many of the same objectives. For instance, both 
can protect psychological integrity
93
 by preventing or mitigating embarrassment or distress 
caused as a result of the unwanted disclosure of personal facts.
94
 Data protection and privacy 
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also, for instance, have a role to play in ensuring that State data processing remains within the 
limits of the law thereby reducing the risk or gravity of abuse of power by the State. Privacy 
violations, such as unauthorised surveillance, and personal data processing can also have a 
‘chilling effect’ on individuals causing them to feel monitored and consequently modify their 
behaviour. The rights to data protection and privacy help to deter and regulate such unauthorised 
surveillance or dataveillance
95
 allowing individuals to behave in an uninhibited manner and to 
exercise the rights guaranteed in democratic societies, such as freedom of expression and 
association, without fear of repercussion.
96
 The fact that data protection and privacy promote 
many of the same goals is consistent with the finding in section three that the two rights are 
heavily overlapping. However, it was also established in section three that data protection grants 
individuals more rights over more personal data than the right to privacy. The aim of this section 
is to determine why this is so.  
 
A. The Functions of an Independent Right to Data Protection  
According to the 1995 Data Protection Directive its aim is to ‘protect the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing 
of personal data’ and to ensure that states do not restrict or prohibit data flows for reasons 
connected with the protection offered to individuals. The Directive does not elaborate on these 
rather vague objectives. Nor, looking at this issue from an alternative angle, have the harms 
which EU data protection law seeks to prevent or mitigate been identified by the EU Institutions. 
This failure to identify the objectives of the law is remiss, particularly at a time when the 
legislative framework for data protection is in flux and there is increasing support for a ‘risk-
based’ approach to data protection law. This part therefore seeks to identify the functions of an 
independent right to data protection.  
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The data protection rules, which give expression to the right to data protection, are arguably 
more effective than the right to privacy at minimising the risk for individuals of certain tangible 
harms caused by data processing.
97
 Take the example of discrimination. Data protection reduces 
the risk of discrimination by decreasing the possibility that proxies or presumptions will be used 
to make decisions which negatively affect individuals. This is because data protection prohibits 
decision-makers from taking decisions which are likely to significantly affect the individual 
based solely on automated data processing.
98
 Accordingly, human attention must be given to an 
individual’s personal data before a decision can be made which may significantly affect that 
individual, arguably therefore making direct and indirect discrimination more difficult. For 
instance, an employer cannot automatically refuse to consider all applicants aged over 30 from a 
job selection process (direct discrimination) nor could the employer exclude all candidates whose 
University qualifications were acquired over ten years ago from the process (indirect 
discrimination).
99
 Equally, it could be argued that the right to data protection is distinct from the 
right to privacy as it provides tools to minimise the risk of identity theft. As the European 
Commission has noted, ‘the creation of centralised databases of identifying data...represents in 
principle a single point of vulnerability for large-scale identity theft and it would be reasonable, 
on these grounds alone, to try to minimise the number of such databases’.100 While, perhaps 
paradoxically, data protection rules may on the whole facilitate the creation of such centralised 
databases, these data protection rules also reinforce the vulnerable architecture of such databases 
thereby reducing the risk of identity theft. For instance, pursuant to data protection rules there is 
an obligation on data controllers to ‘implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, 
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alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access’.101 Equally, competent data protection authorities 
and the data subject must be informed when there is a data breach.
102
 However, beyond the 
prevention or minimisation of such tangible risks, it is submitted that the right to data protection 
is distinct from, and adds value to, the right to privacy in two key ways.  
 
1. Promoting Informational Self-Determination and Individual Personality Rights 
An individual may face multiple obstacles to his or her personal development. As previously 
mentioned, surveillance conducted via data processing can have a chilling effect on individual 
behaviour. Crucially, whether or not an individual is actually being monitored is not decisive in 
these circumstances: the mere perception of surveillance may be sufficient to inhibit individual 
behaviour. Indeed, this is the premise on which Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon 
architectural design is based: the potentially ‘all-seeing’ structure of the Panopticon assures the 
‘automatic functioning of power’.103 Such surveillance, which both privacy and data protection 
seek to deter, can hinder individual development by leading to conformity and ‘an unarmed 
occupation of individuals’ lives’.104 However, surveillance – acutal or perceived – is not the only 
such obstacle to personal development.  
 
An individual may feel more or less inhibited in different circumstances. For instance, a 
student may feel comfortable discussing his thoughts on government immigration policy in a 
student bar with his friends but may feel less comfortable discussing the same topic in his local 
town or with his family. Stated otherwise, an individual’s public persona may have mutliple 
facets. Consequently, individuals may want to engage in what this paper terms ‘selective 
presentation’: presenting to others only those parts of themselves which they want those others to 
see. Such selective presentation enables individuals to put forth different versions or aspects of 
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themselves in different contexts. Consequently, those in work may see one side, those at home 
will see another while those at social events or competitions may see yet another side again.
105
 
This differentiation in terms of how people  present themselves to others is an accepted part of 
daily life. For example, the possibility on social networking sites, such as Google+ and 
Facebook, to limit the availability of certain content to only specific contacts is a reflection of 
this fact. Equally, individuals frequently tailor the content of what they express to their target 
audience: few would speak as frankly to their boss about their work as they would to their 
spouse, for instance. The unauthorised merging of the various facets of an individual’s persona 
can have serious tangible consequences. For example, anecdotal evidence would suggest that 
individuals have been denied employment or access to certain universities on the basis of the 
personal data they have made available on social networking sites. However, perhaps more 
significantly the unauthorised merging of personas can also have a censoring effect on individual 
behaviour and expression similar to that engendered by surveillance.
106
 Indeed, it has been 
documented that individuals make less effort to tailor how they present themselves and have 
fewer inhibitions when fewer people are around.
107
  
 
It is suggested that the right to data protection more effectively facilitates ‘selective 
presentation’ than the right to privacy thereby preventing tangible and intangible harms and 
promoting self-development and the personality rights of individuals.  While the right to privacy 
is a broad notion which is ‘not susceptible to exhaustive definition’ and which lends support to 
the ‘autonomous capacities of individuals to act and cooperate’108, a right to self-determination 
has not yet been established in the ECtHR’s Article 8 jurisprudence.109 Similarly, informational 
self-determination is not explicitly mentioned in Article 8 of the EU Charter despite the fact that 
draft formulations of the right to data protection in the Charter had a greater emphasis on the 
notion of informational self-determination. For instance, the draft of the Charter dating from 5 
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May 2000 provided that ‘[e]veryone has the right to determine for himself whether his personal 
data may be disclosed and how they may be used’.110 A number of factors may explain the late 
change of wording of the right to data protection. For example, ‘informational self-
determination’ may have been perceived by the drafters as more closely aligned to the German 
legal system
111
 than was appropriate in the pluralistic EU legal order. Alternatively, the drafters 
may have recognised the limits of informational self-determination as these earlier formulations 
of the Charter expressed the individual’s ability to make decisions regarding the disclosure and 
use of his personal data in absolute terms. However, such absolute terms do not reflect the reality 
that, for instance, in some circumstances the will of the individual will be prevailed over by the 
common interest.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the departure in the EU Charter from the terminology of informational 
self-determination, it is argued that this concept remains a central tenet of the right to data 
protection and one which distinguishes it from the right to privacy. Data protection provides the 
individual with more informational rights than the right to privacy. For instance, the Proposed 
Regulation provides individuals with a right to data portability as well as a right to be forgotten. 
One explanation for these rights is that they allow individuals to better determine how their data 
is processed, by whom and for what purposes. In other words, they promote informational self-
determination. This informational self-determination allows individuals to self-present: by 
providing individuals with more control over their personal data, they can reveal different 
elements of their personality to different audiences in contrast to the ‘one size fits all’ revelations 
which characterise a lack of control over personal information.  
 
Moreover, the notion that informational self-determination is not an end in itself but rather it 
serves to promote the individual’s right to personality (whether through freedom from 
unauthorised surveillance or by facilitating individual self-presentation) is one which has been 
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endorsed by the German Constitutional Court. In its 1983 Population Census decision
112
 the 
Court held that that the right to informational self-determination of individuals is itself based on 
the right to personality and human dignity.
113
 This perspective has also been endorsed by data 
protection scholars such as Rodotà who observed that the EU had ‘reinvented’ data protection by 
turning it into ‘an essential tool to freely develop one’s personality’.114  
 
2. Data Protection as a Positive Right to Reduce Information and Power Asymmetries   
The second major distinction which it is argued exists between the rights to data protection and 
privacy is that data protection is a proactive tool to reduce power and information asymmetries 
as it strengthens the hand of the individual vis-à-vis data controllers and processors. In this 
regard, the regulatory origins of the right to data protection become apparent: these power and 
information asymmetries are market failures which data protection legislation seeks to correct.
115
 
Power asymmetries are present when one party in a relationship is in a position of relative 
strength to the other while information asymmetries are present when one party in a relationship 
is in possession of more information than another.
116
 Power and information asymmetries 
therefore lead to an unbalanced relationship between individuals (or data subjects) and other data 
processing actors. Information technology often serves to exacerbate the problem.
117
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As Purtova notes, as a result of such power asymmetries ‘an individual is almost always a 
weaker party who is unable to protect his interests without state intervention’.118 The individual’s 
position of relative weakness is problematic for several reasons. First, information asymmetries 
make it more difficult for individuals to make an informed choice about how their personal data 
are processed, in particular because it is difficult for individuals to assess the likelihood that the 
use of their data will result in harm and the seriousness of this potential harm.
119
 Secondly, 
information asymmetries can also constitute an obstacle which individuals must surmount in 
order to hold those who process their personal data accountable. This is because individuals are 
often unable to identify the responsible actors as a result of these information asymmetries.
120
 
Thirdly, information and power asymmetries also clearly disadvantage the bargaining position of 
an individual vis-a-vis a data processor or controller. For instance, Rotenberg has convincingly 
argued that the effect of data profiling is that ‘consumers give up the privacy of their reservation 
price but the seller doesn’t’. In this way, the balance of power in a transaction (for instance, the 
purchase of flights online) is tipped in favour of the profiler to the detriment of the consumer.
121
 
 
Information and power asymmetries can also have less immediately discernible effects 
however. Broadly speaking, these asymmetries can have a negative impact on individual 
autonomy.
122
 This is because individuals may feel helpless when faced with such asymmetries. 
As Dyson highlights, ‘[N]o one knows what is known and what isn’t. It’s the one-way mirror 
effect that makes people so uneasy’.123 Indeed, Solove argues that it is incorrect to frame the 
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problems engendered by personal data processing in Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ terms on the basis 
of surveillance. Rather, he suggests that the harm which data processing causes relates to the 
sense of powerlessness felt by individuals in the face of personal data processing.
124
 Solove 
therefore describes the problem as Kafkaesque: data processing alters the relationships that 
individuals have with those making decisions about their lives.
125
 Similarly, Glancy notes that 
the movements of individuals can increasingly be tracked without their knowledge, and that ‘the 
realisation that such centralised tracking is possible impresses a profound sense of powerlessness 
upon an individual and affects her choices about where, and where not, to go’.126 
 
It is suggested that the right to data protection goes further than the right to privacy in 
rectifying and mitigating these power and information asymmetries by anticipating that 
‘individuals...have difficulty asserting their preferences for privacy protection’ and consequently 
it consists of ‘a set of legal norms that balance individual privacy interests against those of 
industry and bureaucracy’.127 Indeed, the Dutch Government explicitly rejected the recognition 
of a constitutional right to informational self-determination ‘fearing that such a right would tilt 
the balance between the individual and the state too far in favour of the data subject’.128 How 
then does the right to data protection help mitigate and redress these power and information 
asymmetries? The right to data protection and data protection regulation help to readjust the 
balance of power between the data subject and those who process personal data primarily by 
ensuring that the latter ‘adhere to established limits on the way they use personal information’ 
without which individuals feel powerless.
129
 One such obvious limitation is the principle of 
purpose limitation according to which personal data must be ‘collected for specified, explicit and 
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legitimate purposes and not be further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes’.130 
Indeed, Article 8 of the EU Charter explicitly reiterates this principle when it states that data 
must be processed for specified purposes. This principle helps to create an ‘informational 
division of powers’131 as personal data cannot be freely exchanged in and between public and 
private bodies: it can only be processed and exchanged for specified purposes.
132
  
 
The EU’s Proposed Data Protection Regulation, which like the Directive gives expression 
to the right to data protection, also contains several provisions which seek to redress these power 
and information imbalances. Take the following examples. First, pursuant to the Proposed 
Regulation consent will not constitute a valid legal basis for data processing when there is a clear 
imbalance of power between the data subject and the data controller.
133
 The Regulation states 
that this is ‘especially the case where the data subject is in a situation of dependence from the 
controller, among others, where personal data are processed by the employer of employees’ 
personal data in the employment context’.134 The UK’s regulator, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), has correctly highlighted that this broad claim – that consent 
should be invalid where there is a ‘significant imbalance’ between the data subject and the 
controller – requires qualification.135 Indeed, it could be argued that this tips the balance of 
power too much in favour of the data subject: it is easy to think of examples where employer 
data processing is in fact data subject led, for instance when an employee consents to personal 
data processing to join a subsidised cycle-to-work scheme. Secondly, the Proposed Regulation 
now explicitly requires consent to be ‘opt-in’ in order to be valid.136 This ‘opt-in’ default setting 
means that the data subject must indicate his or her agreement to the data processing ‘either by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action’.137 Such an opt-in default setting can reduce 
information asymmetries as it is ‘information-forcing’ in so far as it places ‘pressure on the 
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better-informed party to disclose material information about how personal data will be used’.138 
Thirdly, the Proposed Regulation seeks to render the rights of data subjects more effective. For 
instance, it imposes an obligation on controllers to adopt procedures and mechanisms to respond 
to data subject access requests within set deadlines and to give reasons in the event that they 
refuse to take action.
139
 These more effective rights strengthen the hand of the individual data 
subject vis-a-vis those who process personal data.  
 
In this section, it has been argued that the right to data protection grants individuals more 
control over more data than the right to privacy for two primary reasons: first, to promote 
informational self-determination which itself flows from the individual’s right to personality and 
second, to redress detrimental power and information asymmetries between data subjects and 
those that process their personal data. Indeed, De Hert and Gutwirth
140
 argue that while privacy 
is a tool which facilitates individual opacity
141
 as it protects individuals from intrusion, data 
protection promotes transparency and accountability.
142
 While the distinction between privacy 
and data protection may be more nuanced – as the right to privacy has evolved beyond protecting 
intrusion into seclusion  and data protection can also protect individuals from such intrusion – 
this distinction serves to highlight that data protection constitutes a positive instrument to equip 
the individual to cope with personal data processing.  
 
Given the significant overlap between the rights, some may nevertheless seek to argue 
that this distinction is merely an academic one with little practical significance. Indeed, as was 
demonstrated in section two, the EU’s highest jurisdiction, the Court of Justice, continues to 
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conflate the two rights. However, it is argued that clarity on the distinction between the two 
rights is necessary for two reasons. Firstly, and perhaps most crucially, the continued conflation 
of these rights stunts the development of the right to data protection with the risk that its ‘added 
values’ – its potential to foster the individuals’ right to personality and reduce information and 
power asymmetries – will be overlooked. Secondly, the current lack of consensus in EU 
jurisdictions regarding the relationship between these rights jeopardises the harmonised 
application of EU data protection rules. Take the following example. In the English case of R v 
Brown (Gregory Michael)
143
 the defendant, a police officer, accessed the Police National 
Computer (PNC) database on two occasions to assist a friend who ran a debt-collection agency 
by checking vehicles owned by debtors from whom the agency had been employed to recover 
debts. No personal data was retrieved on the first occasion; on the second occasion, personal data 
was revealed but no subsequent use was made of that data. The defendant was charged with the 
criminal offence of ‘use’ of personal data for purposes other than those permitted, contrary to the 
UK’s Data Protection Act. On appeal, the House of Lords rejected the prosecution’s contention 
that the offence was committed as soon as personal data were retrieved from the computer with 
the intention of using the information for an unregistered purpose. The House of Lords held that 
something had to be done with the data beyond accessing them in order for criminal sanctions to 
ensue. Clearly, if a purposive approach to data protection was taken in this context, it could be 
argued that the access to the personal data on the PNC database for entirely unauthorised 
purposes exacerbated the power asymmetries between the police officers – the data controllers –
and the individual and therefore the data protection rules should apply. However, in advocating a 
narrow definition of the term use, Lord Goff ignored these purposes of the Act by arguing that 
‘the statutory purpose of the Act is to protect personal data from improper use (or disclosure).144 
While the case could also be confined to its facts in so far as it involves the imposition of a 
criminal penalty
145
, it nevertheless demonstrates the importance of clearly identifying the 
objectives of the right to data protection in the EU.  A court in a different jurisdiction taking a 
different view of the purposes of the right to data protection (for instance, acknowledging that it 
seeks to promote informational self-determination) could easily have reached the opposite 
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conclusion on the same facts. In this way, a lack of consensus regarding the role of intangible 
harm in the interpretation and application of EU data protection law also undermines data 
protection’s market integration objective. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The revelations of the Summer of 2013 that the US and UK government allegedly engaged in 
large scale individual surveillance based on data gathered by or transmitted on behalf of private 
entities had the positive effect of pushing personal data protection to the forefront of public 
consciousness. Data protection has occupied such a prominent position on the legislative agenda 
in the EU since the Commission published its proposed reform package in January 2012. This 
reform package is largely touted as the most contentious and lobbied piece of legislation to ever 
pass through the EU legislative process with over 4,000 amendments to its text proposed during 
its initial reading by the European Parliament. Data protection is beginning to take shape and 
gain importance in the eyes of the public as well as policymakers The aim of this paper was to 
explore the relationship between this key right in the EU legal order and the existing right to 
privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the right to data protection has been treated as a subset of 
the right to privacy by the CJEU. However, it argues that this conflated vision of the two rights is 
misconeived and that the right to data protection provides individuals with more control over 
more personal data than the right to privacy. This enhanced control, it is submitted, serves two 
key purposes: first, it promotes the right to personality of individuals through informational self-
determination and second, it reduces the information and power asymmetries which can have a 
negative impact on individual autonomy. At a time when personal data processing has reached 
an unprecedented scale, the benefits of this enhanced individual control should not be overlooked 
as readily as they have been to date by the CJEU. It is time to recognise a truly independent right 
to data protection.   
 
